Fibre Channel switch

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SAN-switch Qlogic with optical Fibre Channel connectors installed. motorola surfboard modem

In the computer storage field, a Fibre Channel switch is a network switch compatible with the Fibre Channel (FC) protocol. It allows the creation of a Fibre Channel fabric, that is currently the core component of most storage area networks. The fabric is a network of Fibre Channel devices which allows many-to-many communication, device name lookup, security, and redundancy. FC switches implement zoning, a mechanism that disables unwanted traffic between certain fabric nodes. motorola surfboard modems

A Fibre Channel director is, by current convention, a switch with at least 128 ports. It does not differ from a switch in core FC protocol functionality. The term itself initially soaked from old ESCON technology. 56k voice modem

Fibre Channel switches may be deployed one at a time or in larger multi-switch configurations. SAN administrators typically add new switches as their server and storage needs grow, connecting switches together via fiber optic cable using the standard device ports. Some switch vendors now offer dedicated high-speed stacking ports to handle inter-switch connections (similar to existing stackable Ethernet switches), allowing high-performance multi-switch configurations to be created using fewer switches overall.

Major manufacturers of Fibre Channel switches are: Brocade, Cisco Systems, and QLogic.

See also

Host Bus Adapter (HBA)

List of Fibre Channel switches

List of Fibre Channel Host Bus Adapters

Fibre Channel

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Human mortality from H5N1

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H5N1 cases in humans

A graphic exhibiting total cases and mortality incidence is kept current by the WHO at http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/7549914F-5C83-4418-8C20-007ADCC07C61/0/s3.jpg and complements the country-specific information shown below.

Country-specific totals of cases and deaths kept current by the WHO may be viewed by clicking through the links provided at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/en/ Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR) Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) massage chair human touch

History recliner massage

A strain of H5N1 killed chickens in 1959 in Scotland and turkeys in 1991 in England. This strain was "highly pathogenic" (deadly to birds) but caused neither illness nor death in humans. "The precursor of the H5N1 influenza virus that spread to humans in 1997 was first detected in Guangdong, China, in 1996, when it caused a moderate number of deaths in geese and attracted very little attention." In 1997, in Hong Kong, 18 humans were infected and 6 died in the first known case of H5N1 infecting humans. H5N1 had evolved from a zero mortality rate to a 33% mortality rate. chair cushion massager

The first report, in the current wave of HPAI A(H5N1) outbreaks, was of an outbreak that began December 10, 2003 in the Republic of Korea and continued for fourteen weeks. This strain caused asymptomatic infections in humans and may have died out, like the 1959 strain, so that its low mortality level would have little value for predicting the mortality rate of a pandemic evolving from existing HPAI A(H5N1) strains. The apparently extinct strain that caused human deaths from H5N1 in the Northern part of Vietnam in 2003, 2004 and 2005 also had a much lower case mortality rate than the currently existing strains. Changes are occurring in H5N1 that are increasing its pathogenicity in mammals.

From inception through 2007, the total number of WHO-confirmed cases was 349, with 216 of those fatalities (as reported by the U.N. on January 15, 2008, confirming earlier deaths) reflecting a 62% fatality rate among WHO-confirmed cases through 2007. These overall figures fail to bring forward fluctuations that have appeared from year to year and in particular geographic areas. In 2005, when a markedly less-lethal strain in Northern Vietnam was responsible for most of the cases reported worldwide, only 42 of 97 people confirmed by the WHO to be infected with H5N1 died a 43% fatality rate. In 2006, the case fatality ratio was higher among the WHO-confirmed cases, with 79 deaths among 114 confirmed cases. or 69%. In 2007, 59 of the 86 WHO-confirmed cases ended in death, again a 69% fatality rate. And 24 of the first 31 cases of 2008 (to April 30, 2008) have been fatal, or 77%.

The higher total case fatality ratio after the end of 2005 may reflect the widespread circulation in Vietnam of a less-lethal clade of H5N1 in 2005, which was subsequently brought under control. The change was nonetheless interpreted by some as indicating that the virus itself was becoming more deadly over time. In fact, when less-virulent strains die off, the surviving strains are the more virulent. Such difficulties in interpretation underscore that the global case fatality ratio can serve as but a crude and imperfect summary of the current complex situation with its many contributing factors, and not a clear or reliable predictive tool. If and when an influenza pandemic arises from one of the currently circulating pre-pandemic strains of Asian lineage HPAI A(H5N1), the mortality rates for the resulting human adapted pandemic strain cannot be predicted with any confidence.

Existing pre-pandemic global case fatality ratio

The global case fatality ratio looks only to the official tally of cases confirmed by the WHO. It takes no account of other cases, such as those appearing in press reports. Nor does it reflect any estimate of the global extent of mild, asymptomatic, or other cases which are undiagnosed, unreported by national governments to the WHO, or for any reason cannot be confirmed by the WHO. While the WHO's case count is clearly the most authoritative, these unavoidable limitations result in an unknown number of cases being omitted from it. The problem of overlooked but genuine cases is emphasized by occasional reports in which later serology reveals antibodies to the H5N1 infection in the blood of persons who were never known to have bird flu, and who then are confirmed by the WHO only retroactively as "cases." Press reports of such cases, often poultry handlers, have appeared in various countries. The largest number of asymptomatic cases was confirmed in 2006 among Korean workers who had assisted in massive culls of H5N1-infected poultry. This relatively benign Korean strain of H5N1 has died out, and the remaining strains of H5N1 have a higher case fatality rate in humans.

Unconfirmed cases have a potentially huge impact on the case fatality ratio. This mathematical impact is well-understood by epidemiologists, and is easy to see in theory. For example, if for each confirmed case reported by the WHO we assume that there has been another mild and unreported case, the actual global number of cases would be double the current number of WHO-confirmed cases. The fatality ratio for H5N1 infections would then be calculated as the same number of deaths, but divided by a doubled number for total cases, resulting in a hypothetical death ratio of half the currently-reported fatality ratio. Such a result would indicate to epidemiologists that the world was confronting an H5N1 virus that is less-lethal than currently assumed, although possibly one that was more contagious and difficult to track.

A case-fatality ratio based on an accurate and all-inclusive count of cases would be invaluable, but unfortunately it is impossible to attain. The ability to diagnose every case of H5N1 as it arises does not exist. A few small reported studies have attempted to gather preliminary data on this crucial statistic, by carrying out systematic blood testing of neighbors and contacts of fatal cases in villages where there had been confirmed H5N1 fatalities. In most cases, this testing failed to turn up any overlooked mild cases, though in at least one study mild overlooked cases were identified. These methodical studies of contacts provide significant evidence that the high death rate among confirmed cases in the villages where these studies were carried out cannot be simply attributed to a wholesale failure to detect mild cases. Unfortunately, these studies are likely to remain too few and sketchy to define the complex situation worldwide regarding the lethality of the varying H5N1 clades. The testing and reporting necessary for mass serology studies to determine the incidence of overlooked cases for each existing clade and strain of H5N1 worldwide would be prohibitively costly.

Hence the precise allocation of infections by the various H5N1 clades across the spectrum including lethal, serious, mild, and asymptomatic cases is likely to remain unknown in both humans and the hundreds of other species it can infect. Scientists are very concerned about what we do know about H5N1; but even more concerned about the vast amount of important data that we don't know about H5N1 and its future mutations.

Demographic characteristics

Review of patient ages and outcomes reveals that H5N1 attacks are especially lethal in pre-adults and young adults, while older victims tend to have milder attacks and to survive. This is consistent with the frequent development of a cytokine storm in the afflicted. Few persons over 50 years of age seem to have become infected by H5N1, and very few have died after suffering an H5N1 attack. Instead, the age-fatality curve of H5N1 influenza attacks in humans resembles that of the 1918 Spanish pandemic flu, and is the opposite of the mortality curve of seasonal flu strains, since seasonal influenza preferentially kills the elderly and does not kill by cytokine storm. An additional factor which may be active is that H1N1 was the predominate human flu circulating from 1918 until 1957 when the H2N2 strain emerged. Hence those over 50 years old have had the opportunity to be exposed to H1N1, and to develop some immune response to the N1 group contained in that human form of flu. Likewise, annual flu vaccination includes inoculation against a type-A human H1N1 flu, leading to the possibility that the annual flu shot or Flumist inoculation might confer some immunity against H5N1 bird flu infection, and indeed testing the blood of volunteers to look for immune response to H5N1 found that some blood samples showed immunity, but more of the blood samples of persons who had received the flu shot showed an immune response.

Another factor complicating any attempt to predict lethality of an eventual pandemic strain is the variability of the resistance of human victims to the pathogen. Many human victims of the current H5N1 influenza have been blood relatives (but rarely spouses) of other victims. Though this observation seemed to suggest that a familial genetic susceptibility might have played a role in human infection, a study by researchers at the Harvard School of public health noted no significant familial pattern of infection. Clearly, those whose immune systems are best able to fight off the virus are the most likely to survive a pandemic. Those with impairment of the needed immune function, whether from familial genetics or from AIDS, have poorer chances. Moreover, the health care system is generally expected to be overwhelmed throughout a pandemic. Persons needing access to medical care, whether for influenza or for unrelated serious maladies, are unlikely to receive the accustomed care, and without it their survival chances will be reduced.

Predicting pandemic mortality rate

Although the actual rate of mortality during a pandemic is unknowable in advance, it is pressing to predict the possible ranges for that lethality responsibly in advance. The pre-pandemic case fatality ratio of over 50% provides a grim backdrop for the fact that the currently circulating H5N1 strains have certain genetic similarities with the Spanish Influenza pandemic virus. In that pandemic, 50 million to 100 million people worldwide were killed during about a year in 1918 and 1919 . The highly lethal second and third waves of the 1918 Spanish flu evolved through time into a less virulent and more transmissible human form. Although the overall fatality rate for the Spanish Flu was at most 1% to 2% of the population, the lethal waves of the Spanish Flu are not reported to have emerged with anything like the over-50% case fatality ratio observed to date in human H5N1 infection. Studies indicating that an H5N1 pandemic may be more pathogenic than was the Spanish Flu include a mouse study in which the H5N1 virus elicited significantly higher levels of pro-inflammatory cytokines in the lungs.

Unfortunately, a human H5N1 pandemic might emerge with initial lethality resembling that over-50% case fatality now observed in pre-pandemic H5N1 human cases, rather than with the still-high 1-2% seen with the Spanish Flu or with the lower rates seen in the two more recent influenza pandemics. As a WHO working group noted,

Determinants of virulence and transmissibility.

... One especially important question is whether the H5N1 virus is likely to retain its present high lethality should it acquire an ability to spread easily from person to person, and thus start a pandemic. Should the virus improve its transmissibility by acquiring, through a reassortment event, internal human genes, then the lethality of the virus would most likely be reduced. However, should the virus improve its transmissibility through adaptation as a wholly avian virus, then the present high lethality could be maintained during a pandemic.

The U.S. CDC presents a similarly sobering conclusion authored by Robert G. Webster et al.:

... We cannot afford simply to hope that human-to-human spread of H5N1 will not happen and that, if it does, the pathogenicity of the virus will attenuate. Notably, the precursor of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)ssociated coronavirus (31) repeatedly crossed species barriers, probably for many years, before it finally acquired the capacity for human-to-human transmission, and its pathogenicity to humans was not attenuated. We cannot wait and allow nature to take its course. SARS was interrupted by early case detection and isolation, but influenza is transmissible early in the course of the disease and cannot be controlled by similar means.

Although some mammalian adaptations have been noted, H5N1 remains better adapted for infecting birds than mammallian hosts, which is why the disease it causes is called a bird flu. No pandemic strain of H5N1 has yet been found. The precise nature and extent of the genetic alterations that might change one of the currently circulating avian influenza strains into a human flu strain cannot be known in advance.

While many of the current H5N1 strains circulating in birds can generate a dangerous cytokine storm in healthy adult humans, the ultimate pandemic strain might arise from a less-lethal strain, or its current level of lethality might be lost in the adaptation to a human host.

If H5N1 mutates so that it can jump from human to human, while maintaining a relatively high level of mortality, how many people could die? Risk communication analysts Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard give a round-up of the various estimates:

Worldwide mortality estimates range all the way from 2-7.4 million deaths (the onservatively low pandemic influenza calculation of a flu modeling expert at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) to 1000 million deaths (the bird flu pandemic prediction of one Russian virologist). The estimates of most H5N1 experts range less widely but still widely. In an H5N1 pandemic, the experts guess that somewhere between a quarter of us and half of us would get sick, and somewhere between one percent and five percent of those who got sick would die the young and hale as well as the old and frail. If it's a quarter and one percent, that's 16 million dead; if it's a half and five percent, it's 160 million dead. Either way it's a big number.

The renowned virus expert Robert G. Webster provided perhaps the most extreme estimate when he acknowledged in March 2003 that H5N1 has the theoretical capacity to mutate into a form that could kill one half of the human population, stating, "Society just can't accept the idea that 50 percent of the population could die. And I think we have to face that possibility".

Genetic factors

Main article: H5N1 genetic structure

H5N1 may cause more than one influenza pandemic as it is expected to continue mutating in birds regardless of whether humans develop herd immunity to a future pandemic strain. Influenza pandemics from its genetic offsring may include influenza A virus subtypes other than H5N1. While genetic analysis of the H5N1 virus shows that influenza pandemics from its genetic offspring can easily be far more lethal than the Spanish Flu pandemic, planning for a future influenza pandemic is based on what can be done and there is no higher Pandemic Severity Index level than a Category 5 pandemic which, roughly speaking, is any pandemic as bad the Spanish flu or worse; and for which all intervention measures are to be used.

There "is evidence of at least three independent virulence factors connected with three different genes. It is highly unlikely that all of the high-virulence alleles will simultaneously mutate and disappear if and when the haemagglutinin gene changes so as to make the haemagglutinin molecule better adapted for the human-type (alpha-2,6-linked) receptor (which is a necessary prerequisite in order that a pandemic with H5N1 virus may start). It is more probable that evolutionary adaptation of the haemagglutinin of H5N1 viruses to the human-type receptor will happen without any simultaneous change in those other genetic properties that now are important for explaining the exceptionally high virulence of certain strains of avian-adapted H5N1 influenza virus. The change of the haemagglutinin molecule from avian adaptation to human adaptation must be expected to act as an additional virulence factor because it will enhance the total number of cells that can be infected (per host organism), increase the total rate of virus replication and potentiate the effects of the other virulence factors already present." The H5N1 genes work together in ways we don't yet understand. Influenza research is continuing. The genetic factors that make H5N1 so deadly are only partly understood. Known factors involve the surface antigen encoding gene segments H (hemagglutinin) and N (neuraminidase) genes (causing it to be H5N1 for example), as well as the matrix M2 gene, and the polymerase genes.

"In order to cause a pandemic, H5N1 viruses will have to acquire the ability to transmit efficiently from person to person. The H5 hemagglutinin (HA) is found in influenza viruses that typically infect avian species, so efficient person-to-person spread could happen if the H5N1 virus reassorts, or exchanges genes, with circulating human influenza viruses giving rise to a virus with the H5 HA (to which the population is not immune) in a gene constellation that confers the property of transmissibility. Alternatively, efficient person-to-person spread could occur if the H5N1 virus evolves and adapts to more efficient replication and transmissibility in the human population."

A change of just two genes identified in laboratory testing appears to substantially increase the affinity of H5N1 for binding with human cell surface receptors.

Neuraminidase is an antigenic glycoprotein enzyme found on the surface of the influenza viruses. It helps the release of progeny viruses from infected cells. Flu drugs Tamiflu and Relenza work by inhibiting some strains of neuraminidase. They were developed based on N2 and N9. "In the N1 form of the protein, a small segment called the 150-loop is inverted, creating a hollow pocket that does not exist in the N2 and N9 proteins. [...] When the researchers looked at how existing drugs interacted with the N1 protein, they found that, in the presence of neuraminidase inhibitors, the loop changed its conformation to one similar to that in the N2 and N9 proteins."

The amino acid substitution (Ser31Asn) in the M2 gene in some H5N1 genotypes is associated with amantadine resistance which increases lethality. However the pathogenicity of H5N1/97 was related to the nonstructural (NS) gene. NS codes for two nonstructural proteins (NS1 and NEP). The NS1 gene of the highly pathogenic avian H5N1 viruses circulating in poultry and waterfowl in Southeast Asia is believed to be responsible for an enhanced proinflammatory cytokine response (especially TNFa) induced by these viruses in human macrophages. H5N1 NS1 is characterized by a single amino acid change at position 92. By changing the amino acid from glutamic acid to aspartic acid, researchers were able to abrogate the effect of the H5N1 NS1. This single amino acid change in the NS1 gene greatly increased the pathogenicity of the H5N1 influenza virus. This is one genetic factor in why H5N1 is so deadly.

Polymerase encoding gene segments are also implicated in why H5N1 is so deadly. PA genes code for the PA protein, which is a critical component of the viral polymerase. The PB1 gene codes for the PB1 protein and the PB1-F2 protein. The PB1-F2 protein probably contributes to viral pathogenicity and might have an important role in determining the severity of pandemic influenza. Until H5N1, all known avian influenza viruses had a Glu at position 627, while all human influenza viruses had a lysine. Recently, some 75% of H5N1 human virus isolates identified in Vietnam had a mutation consisting of Lysine at residue 627 in the PB2 protein; a change believed associated with high levels of virulence.

Areas of research

Areas of research to identify the likelihood of rapid or slow evolution to human contagion, or for predicting the greater or lesser likelihood of a rather lethal human-adapted influenza include:

bird species susceptibility

bird migration paths

cell based vaccine development

adjuvant testing

human vaccine clinical trials

bird vaccine testing and use

computer simulations of pandemic spread patterns (e.g. will grounding flights help?)

detailed shape and gene code analysis of each of the RNA stands for as many flu virus strains as possible and making them available on a database for study

wild bird testing for flu viruses

testing humans for asymptomatic H5N1 infection

training exercises in case of a pandemic

Computer simulations and direct gene manipulation have yielded inconclusive results.

Scientific advances

Scientific advances may attenuate probable lethality. The genetic lethality potential of the initial flu pandemic strain is only one important factor in determining the ultimate outcome in number of human lives lost. Another factor that grows potentially more important with the passage of time is human preparation. For example, no influenza vaccine specific to H5N1 could be produced when it emerged in Hong Kong in 1997, because it was lethal to eggs. Reverse DNA techniques have since made a vaccine possible, and several H5N1 vaccines have been tested and are in production in at least limited quantities. Vaccine development and production facilities are being ramped up, and possible pre-pandemic vaccines are being produced and studied. If a human pandemic does not emerge in the next few years, its eventual emergence may become almost a non-event if a very-effective pre-pandemic vaccine has prepared the population with sufficient herd immunity to blunt its lethality. Indeed, if there is sufficient immunity to stop it at the source, it will not become pandemic.

As long as the likelihood of protecting the population continues to rise with the passage of time, that likelihood becomes an increasingly important factor in predicting the loss of lives and the amount of economic dislocation that will ultimately occur. In light of human potential to develop herd immunity via vaccination in advance of a pandemic strain, the time that it allows us to do so before it evolves may become as crucial or more crucial to the measure of damage it causes than its own lethality and contagiousness.

Among the more attractive alternatives available for reducing mortality is vaccine stockpiling and prepandemic vaccination. "Human H5N1 vaccines are currently available and can induce heterotypic immunity. WHO and governments should give urgent consideration to the use of these vaccines for the priming of individuals or communities who would be at greatest risk of infection if an H5N1 influenza pandemic were to emerge." Death associated with influenza A viruses "is usually mediated by superinfection with bacteria, mainly Streptococcus pneumoniae.", suggesting that lethality may be reduced by vaccination against pneumonia.

Preparation

Among others, the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has repeatedly pointed out the key role of preparation in reducing pandemic mortality, including as examples research in cell- and DNA-based vaccines, as well as stockpiling available vaccines and antivirals and increasing vaccine manufacturing capacity.

Planning reports

Governments and other organizations at many levels and in many places have produced "planning" reports that, among other things, have offered speculation on the mortality rate of an eventual H5N1 pandemic. That speculation has varied widely. One such report stated that "over half a million Americans could die and over 2.3 million could be hospitalized if a moderately severe strain of a pandemic flu virus hits the U.S.". No one knew if "moderately severe" was an accurate guess or not. A report entitled A Killer Flu? projected that, with an assumed (guessed) contraction rate of just 25%, and with a severity rate as low as that of the two lowest severity flu pandemics of the 1900s, a modern influenza A pandemic would cause 180 thousand deaths in the US, while a pandemic equaling the 1918 Spanish Flu in level of lethality would cause one million deaths in the US. Again, the report offered no evidence that an emerging H5N1 flu pandemic would be between these figures.

The current avian flu, in humans, is fatal in over 50% of confirmed cases. Yet early projections like those above have assumed that such a lethal avian strain would surely lose genes contributing to its lethality in humans as it made the adaptations necessary for ready transmission in the human population. This optimistic assumption cannot be relied on. As the WHO reported in November 2006, initial outbreaks of an H5N1 pandemic could rival the current lethality of over 50%. Further information necessary to make an accurate projection of initial lethality of an H5N1 pandemic does not exist, as no data was collected that could show the pre-pandemic virulence in any potential flu strain until after the last pandemic of the 20th Century. There is no basis for assuming that an H5N1 pandemic will emerge with only the far lower 1-2% lethality rate of the Spanish Flu, once assumed to be a worst case scenario. There exists no reliable prediction of the mortality rate of an H5N1 pandemic, and it would be irresponsible to confine planning to only optimistic assumptions out of step with the currently observed case fatality ratio.

Although marred by unrealistically low ranges of assumed mortality, the earlier planning reports nevertheless show convincingly that we are not prepared even for a pandemic as severe as the milder pandemics of the past century., let alone the much higher case fatality ratios seen more recently.

Sources and notes

^ Li FC, Choi BC, Sly T, Pak AW (June 2008). "Finding the real case-fatality rate of H5N1 avian influenza". J Epidemiol Community Health 62 (6): 5559. doi:10.1136/jech.2007.064030. PMID 18477756. http://jech.bmj.com/cgi/content/abstract/62/6/555. 

^ Donald G. McNeil Jr. (June 4, 2006). "Human Flu Transfers May Exceed Reports". New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/04/world/asia/04flu.html?ex=1150084800&en=595ebe1cf527875b&ei=5070&emc=eta1. 

^ "Seven Indonesian Bird Flu Cases Linked to Patients". Bloomberg. May 23, 2006. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=aWESsJvt6CFE&refer=asia. 

^ "WHO confirms human transmission< in Indonesian bird flu cluster". http://www.foodconsumer.org/777/8/WHO_Confirms_Human_Transmission_In_Indonesian_Bird_Flu_Cluster.shtml. 

^ "Avian influenza situation in Indonesia update 17". WHO. June 6, 2006. http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006_06_06/en/index.html. 

^ "HHS has enough H5N1 vaccine for 4 million people". CIDRAP. July 5, 2006. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/jul0506hhsreport.html. 

^ "Study supports concept of 2-stage H5N1 vaccination". CIDRAP. October 13, 2006. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/oct1306vaccines.html. 

^ Pre-pandemic bird flu shots eyed / Health ministry to urge study of potential early vaccination recipients | (Daily Yomiuri Online + AP -- Apr. 25, 2009) http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20090425TDY03103.htm

^ Japan to vaccinate medical workers for bird flu | Reuters May 15, 2008 | http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080415/hl_nm/birdflu_japan_dc

^ Measures against flu needed / Govt urged to set up framework to fight new influenza outbreak Apr. 24, 2008 http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/features/science/20080424TDY04302.htm

^ Vaccinations for new flu strains eyed for public (Apr. 17, 2008) http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20080417TDY02301.htm

^ a b c http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/aug1007mutant.html Researchers create H5N1 mutations to pave way for new vaccines and treatments Aug 10, 2007 (CIDRAP News) "Focusing on genetic changes to one portion of the H5 protein, called the receptor binding domain, [the researchers] found that as few as two mutations could enhance the ability of H5N1 to recognize human cells, according to the press release."

Yang ZY, Wei CJ, Kong WP, et al. (August 2007). "Immunization by avian H5 influenza hemagglutinin mutants with altered receptor binding specificity". Science 317 (5839): 8258. doi:10.1126/science.1135165. PMID 17690300. 

^ Dennis J. Alexander*. "A review of avian influenza in different bird species" (PDF). Avian Virology, VLA Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK. http://www.lib.cau.edu.cn/qlga/86a.pdf. 

^ "Situation (poultry) in Asia: need for a long-term response, comparison with previous outbreaks". Disease Outbreak News: Avian influenza A(H5N1) (WHO). March 2, 2004. http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_03_02/en/. Retrieved 2006-10-27. 

^ a b Webster RG, Peiris M, Chen H, Guan Y (January 2006). "H5N1 outbreaks and enzootic influenza". Emerging Infect. Dis. 12 (1): 38. PMID 16494709. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no01/05-1024.htm. 

^ WHO (October 28, 2005). "H5N1 avian influenza: timeline" (PDF). http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/Timeline_28_10a.pdf. 

^ a b Tan Ee Lyn (February 1, 2007). "Don't ignore less virulent bird flu strains: experts" ([dead link] Scholar search). Scientific American. http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa003&articleID=0E143C3BEF0F7759C230664C4DC905F8. 

^ South Korea raises H5N1 culling target to 5.3 million Lisa Schnirring * Staff Writer Apr 21, 2008 (CIDRAP News)http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/apr2108culling(2).html

^ "Five Koreans had H5N1 virus but no illness". CIDRAP. September 21, 2006. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/sep2106korea.html. 

^ a b WHO (August 18, 2006). "Antigenic and genetic characteristics of H5N1 viruses and candidate H5N1 vaccine viruses developed for potential use as pre-pandemic vaccines" (PDF). http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/guidelines/recommendationvaccine.pdf.  Contains latest Evolutionary "Tree of Life" for H5N1

^ Chen H, Deng G, Li Z, Tian G, Li Y, Jiao P, Zhang L, Liu Z, Webster RG, Yu K. (2004). "The evolution of H5N1 influenza viruses in ducks in southern China". Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 101 (28): 104527. doi:10.1073/pnas.0403212101. PMID 15235128. 

^ http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/oct0507avian.html H5N1 mutation that could help spark pandemic identified "The change promotes better viral replication at the lower temperatures found in the upper airways of mammals..." Additionally, discussing the same mutation, one of the researchers points out that the mutated strain is in wide circulation:

"The viruses that are circulating in Africa and Europe are the ones closest to becoming a human virus," Kawaoka said. But he pointed out that one mutation is not sufficient to turn H5N1 into a major threat to humans.

^ http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2008_01_15/en/index.html Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO / 15 January 2008 For possible later updates by the WHO, see links at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/en/

^ "Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO". WHO. December 29, 2006. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2006_12_27/en/index.html. 

^ (including cases reported to and confirmed by the WHO up to January 24, 2008) http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2008_01_24/en/index.html Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO / 24 January 2008 | For later updates by the WHO, see http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/en/

^ http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2008_04_30/en/index.html Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO 30 April 2008. For later totals as the WHO provides updates, click through links at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/en/ Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR) Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1)

^ "H5N1 Getting Deadlier". http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2007_05_24/en/index.html.  based on the article "Bird Flu Fatality Rate in Humans Climbs to 64% as Virus Spreads". http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=a7CJ0uPPpg.g. 

^ The tally may be obtained by clicking a link to the most current date shown by the UN on the WHO's web page entitled Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR) http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/en/

^ http://www.medpagetoday.com/InfectiousDisease/URItheFlu/tb/5964 Options For Influenza Control VI (Conference, Toronto Canada, June 18, 2007) Even those who were in close contact with both infected birds and infected people showed no sign of ever having been infected, Dr. Dejpichai and colleagues found. The study is consistent with findings in Hong Kong, China, and Cambodia, which showed viral seroprevalence of no more than 10% among poultry workers and people living in villages where H5N1 outbreaks occurred, she said. But it contradicts a population-based study in Vietnam, published last year, that concluded that mild cases of the virus were likely to be common. (see Mild Avian Flu Transmission May Be Common) http://www.medpagetoday.com/InfectiousDisease/URItheFlu/tb/2450 Primary source: Archives of Internal Medicine Source reference: Thorson A, Petzold M, Nguyen TK, Ekdahl K (January 2006). "Is exposure to sick or dead poultry associated with flulike illness?: a population-based study from a rural area in Vietnam with outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza". Arch. Intern. Med. 166 (1): 11923. doi:10.1001/archinte.166.1.119. PMID 16401820. 

"... 45 478 randomly selected (cluster sampling) inhabitants. Household representatives were asked screening questions about exposure to poultry and flulike illness ...

... A dose-response relationship between poultry exposure and flulike illness was noted: poultry in the household (odds ratio, 1.04; 95% confidence interval, 0.96-1.12), sick or dead poultry in the household but with no direct contact (odds ratio, 1.14; 95% confidence interval, 1.06-1.23), and direct contact with sick poultry (odds ratio, 1.73; 95% confidence interval, 1.58-1.89). The flulike illness attributed to direct contact with sick or dead poultry was estimated to be 650 to 750 cases.

CONCLUSIONS: Our epidemiological data are consistent with transmission of mild, highly pathogenic avian influenza to humans and suggest that transmission could be more common than anticipated, though close contact seems required. Further microbiological studies are needed to validate these findings."

But note the discussion and critique New Study of Bird Flu Raises Important Issues January 9, 2006 http://www.acsh.org/factsfears/newsID.685/news_detail.asp

"Are the conclusions of this one study enough to warrant rethinking the current bird-flu paradigm and considering this threat similar to that posed by the similar "Asian Flu," as opposed to the deadly "Spanish Flu" pandemic? (The Asian Flu pandemic occurred in 1957-8, and caused millions of cases but much lower mortality than the global "Spanish flu" of 1918-9, which killed over 20 million.) Unfortunately, no. While, on its surface, the new study seems to point in that direction, a closer analysis of the study reveals several weaknesses, the most important of which is that no blood samples were taken. As a result, no data on antibody status could be collected, nor could there be any confirmation of a specific viral cause of the reported ailments.

Indeed, it is just as likely that the illnesses sustained by the rural Vietnamese were caused by some other virus, not a bird-type flu at all or that if their ailments were due to bird contact, that the cause was any number of bird flu variants, rather than the lethal H5N1 strain being studied intensively now. ... "

^ "Five Koreans had H5N1 virus but no illness (21 September 2006)". CIDRAP. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/sep2106korea.html. Retrieved 2006-08-23. 

^ http://www.recombinomics.com/News/10030701/H5N1_Jakarta_Cluster.html H5N1 Cluster Raises Surveillance Concerns In Indonesia Recombinomics Commentary October 3, 2007 (Suggests Indonesian cases may be less lethal than feared, but more prevalent due to various under-sampling errors.) (Note: This reference needs to be replaced with a better one. Recombinomics and Henry L Niman are not credible sources according to the UN experts on bird flu.)

^ "Cambodian study hints at subclinical H5N1 cases". CIDRAP. January 25, 2008. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/jan2508bangkok-jw.html. 

^ "Mild H5N1 cases weren found missed in Cambodian outbreak study". CIDRAP. March 27, 2006. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/mar2706cases.html. 

^ "Cambodian study suggests mild H5N1 cases are rare". CIDRAP. September 7, 2006. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/sep0706cambodia.html. 

^ "Epidemiology of WHO-confirmed human cases of avian influenza A(H5N1) infection". Wkly. Epidemiol. Rec. 81 (26): 24957. June 2006. PMID 16812929. http://www.who.int/wer/2006/wer8127/en/index.html. "The median age of confirmed cases was 20 years. The age of cases ranged from 3 months to 75 years (n = 202). Half of the cases occurred among people aged <20 years; 90% occurred among those aged <40 years (Fig. 2). Among cases aged <10 years, 21 children were aged <5 years and 32 children were aged between 5 years and 9 years.". 

^ "Human Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Cases by Age Group and Country". http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/299B9BDC-67D8-40AC-81BE-0BC8D38E296A/0/S2_0814.jpg. 

^ Smallman-Raynor M, Cliff AD (March 2007). "Avian influenza A (H5N1) age distribution in humans". Emerging Infect. Dis. 13 (3): 5102. doi:10.3201/eid1303.060849. PMID 17552119. PMC 2141519. http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/13/3/06-0849.htm. 

^ "Immediate Treatment Needed for Bird Flu Cases, Study Says". New York Times. September 11, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/11/world/11flu.html. 

^ U.N. chart, "Human Avian Influenza (H5N1) Cases by Age Group and Outcome" http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/FD4AC2FD-B7C8-4A13-A32C-6CF328A0C036/0/Slide4.jpg

^ a b Gioia C, Castilletti C, Tempestilli M, et al. (January 2008). "Cross-subtype immunity against avian influenza in persons recently vaccinated for influenza". Emerging Infect. Dis. 14 (1): 1218. doi:10.3201/eid1401.061283. PMID 18258091. PMC 2600140. http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/14/1/121.htm. "We also observed that seasonal vaccination is able to raise neutralizing immunity against influenza (H5N1) in a large number of donors.". 

^ Olsen SJ, Ungchusak K, Sovann L, et al. (November 2005). "Family clustering of avian influenza A (H5N1)". Emerging Infect. Dis. 11 (11): 17991801. PMID 16422010. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no11/05-0646.htm. 

listed 15 family clusters, in which three included a husband and wife pair. (Only two of these pairs had all four members actually confirmed as H5N1 positive.) The "blood relative theory" is, so far, too weak to be called a theory. It is an observation, with some reasoning that could support it as a hypothesis (the genetic tendency possibility, for instance).

^ I. Nyoman Kandun et al. (November 23, 2006). "Three Indonesian Clusters of H5N1 Virus Infection in 2005". NEJM 355 (21): 218694. doi:10.1056/NEJMoa060930. PMID 17124016. http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/355/21/2186. 

^ Pitzer VE, Olsen SJ, Bergstrom CT, Dowell SF, Lipsitch M (July 2007). "Little evidence for genetic susceptibility to influenza A (H5N1) from family clustering data". Emerging Infect. Dis. 13 (7): 10746. PMID 18214184. http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/13/7/1074.htm. "Abstract The apparent clustering of human cases of influenza A (H5N1) among blood relatives has been considered as evidence of genetic variation in susceptibility. We show that, by chance alone, a high proportion of clusters are expected to be limited to blood relatives when infection is a rare event.". 

^ "The Threat of Pandemic Influenza: Are We Ready? Workshop Summary (2005)". NAP. http://www.nap.edu/books/0309095042/html/7.html. Retrieved 2006-08-21. 

^ Lucy A. Perrone, Julie K. Plowden, Adolfo Garca-Sastre, Jacqueline M. Katz, Terrence M. Tumpey. "H5N1 and 1918 Pandemic Influenza Virus Infection Results in Early and Excessive Infiltration of Macrophages and Neutrophils in the Lungs of Mice". PLOS. http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info:doi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000115;jsessionid=946EDFB088ADBA6FC348A135B854563C. Retrieved 2008-08-06. 

^ a b CBC CIDRAP WHO PDF

^ Influenza research at the human and animal interface Report of a WHO working group Geneva, Switzerland 2122 September 2006 Numbered page 15, (19th page including non-numbered introductory page) (emphasis original) http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_EPR_GIP_2006_3C.pdf

^ Yen HL, Lipatov AS, Ilyushina NA, et al. (July 2007). "Inefficient transmission of H5N1 influenza viruses in a ferret contact model". J. Virol. 81 (13): 68908. doi:10.1128/JVI.00170-07. PMID 17459930. "Our results suggest that despite their receptor binding affinity, circulating H5N1 viruses retain molecular determinants that restrict their spread among mammalian species.". 

^ WHO working group on influenza research at the human and animal interface (November 2, 2006) (PDF). Influenza research at the human and animal interface. pp. 15. http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_EPR_GIP_2006_3C.pdf.  (alternate version)

^ "Clinical study points to cytokine storm in H5N1 cases". CIDRAP News. September 11, 2006. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/sep1106storm.html. 

^ Menno D de Jong et al. (September 10, 2006). "Fatal outcome of human influenza A (H5N1) is associated with high viral load and hypercytokinemia" ([dead link] Scholar search). Nature 12: 1203. doi:10.1038/nm1477. http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/vaop/ncurrent/abs/nm1477.html.  Published online.

^ http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/jul1607cytokine.html Study: Inhibiting cytokine response might not reverse H5N1 infections

^ Peter M. Sandman, Jody Lanard (December 4, 2004). "Pandemic Influenza Risk Communication: The Teachable Moment". http://www.psandman.com/col/pandemic.htm. Retrieved 2006-10-08. 

^ Robert G. Webster, Elizabeth Jane Walker (March-April 2003). "The world is teetering on the edge of a pandemic that could kill a large fraction of the human population". American Scientist 91 (2): 122. doi:10.1511/2003.2.122. http://www.scs.carleton.ca/~soma/biosec/readings/influenza/influenza.html. Retrieved 2006-10-08. 

^ "Renowned Bird Flu Expert Warns: Be Prepared". ABC News. March 14, 2006. http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/AvianFlu/story?id=1724801. Retrieved 2006-10-08. 

^ Robert G. Webster, Ph.D., and Elena A. Govorkova, M.D., Ph.D. (November 23, 2006). "H5N1 Influenza Continuing Evolution and Spread". NEJM 355 (21): 21742177. doi:10.1056/NEJMp068205. PMID 17124014. http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/355/21/2174. 

^ Taubenberger JK, Morens DM (January 2006). "1918 Influenza: the mother of all pandemics". Emerging Infect. Dis. 12 (1): 1522. PMID 16494711. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no01/05-0979.htm. 

^ a b Informaworld article Why is the world so poorly prepared for a pandemic of hypervirulent avian influenza? published December 2006

^ Roos, Robert; Lisa Schnirring (February 1, 2007). "HHS ties pandemic mitigation advice to severity". University of Minnesota Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP). http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/feb0107pandemic.html. Retrieved 2007-02-03. 

^ Maines TR, Chen LM, Matsuoka Y, et al. (August 2006). "Lack of transmission of H5N1 avian-human reassortant influenza viruses in a ferret model". Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 103 (32): 121216. doi:10.1073/pnas.0605134103. PMID 16880383. 

^ Tumpey TM, Maines TR, Van Hoeven N, et al. (February 2007). "A two-amino acid change in the hemagglutinin of the 1918 influenza virus abolishes transmission". Science 315 (5812): 6559. doi:10.1126/science.1136212. PMID 17272724. http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/short/315/5812/655. 

^ Subbarao K, Luke C (March 2007). "H5N1 viruses and vaccines". PLoS Pathog. 3 (3): e40. doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.0030040. PMID 17335350. 

^ Scidev.net News article Bird flu protein's 'pocket' could inspire better drugs published August 16, 2006

^ Jennings LC, Monto AS, Chan PK, Szucs TD, Nicholson KG (October 2008). "Stockpiling prepandemic influenza vaccines: a new cornerstone of pandemic preparedness plans". Lancet Infect Dis 8 (10): 6508. doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(08)70232-9. PMID 18922487. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473309908702329/abstract. 

^ Stegemann, Dahlberg, Krger, Gereke, Bruder, Henriques-Normark, Increased Susceptibility for Superinfection with Streptococcus pneumoniae during Influenza Virus Infection Is Not Caused by TLR7-Mediated Lymphopenia http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0004840

^ Pandemic Planning Update VI

^ CBN Report: Severe Pandemic Planning Assumptions May Be Too Low

^ "Pandemic Flu Projection Says More Than Half Million Could Die in U.S.". Senior Journal. June 24, 2005. http://www.seniorjournal.com/Spotlights/FLU2005-06/5-06-24PandemicProjections.htm. 

^ "Healthy Americans Flu 2005 report PDF" (PDF). http://healthyamericans.org/reports/flu/Flu2005.pdf. 

^ Jennifer Barrett (May 3, 2006). "A Dramatic Disconnect". Newsweek. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12610942/site/newsweek/. Retrieved 2006-12-11.  estimates two million dead in the US, for example

^ Dr. Martin Meltzer of the Centers for Disease Control, an expert on the societal impact of diseases, warns that here is no healthcare system anywhere in the world that can cope with even a mild pandemic like the one in 1968 Meltzer MI, Lancet Asia Forum, Singapore, May 2006

v  d  e

Influenza

General topics

Research - Vaccine - Treatment - Genome sequencing - Reassortment - Superinfection - Season

Influenza viruses

Orthomyxoviridae - Influenza A - Influenza B - Influenza C

Influenza A virus

Subtypes

H1N1 - H1N2 - H2N2 - H2N3 - H3N1 - H3N2 - H3N8 - H5N1 - H5N2 - H5N3 - H5N8 - H5N9 - H7N1 - H7N2 - H7N3 - H7N4 - H7N7 - H9N2 - H10N7

H1N1

       Pandemics

1918 flu pandemic (Spanish flu) - 2009 flu pandemic (Swine flu)

Science

2009 A/H1N1

H5N1

Science

Genetic structure - Transmission and infection - Global spread - Clinical Trials - Human mortality - Social impact - Pandemic preparation

        Outbreaks

Croatia (2005) - India (2006) - UK (2007) - West Bengal (2008)

Treatments

Antiviral drug

Arbidol - adamantane derivatives (Amantadine, Rimantadine) - neuraminidase inhibitors (Oseltamivir, Laninamivir, Peramivir, Zanamivir)

Experimental (Peramivir)

Flu vaccines

FluMist - Fluzone

Influenza epidemics & pandemics

       Pandemics

Russian flu (18891890) - Spanish flu - Asian flu - Hong Kong flu - 2009 flu pandemic

Epidemics

Russian flu (19771978) - Fujian flu (H3N2)

Non-human

Mammals

Canine influenza - Cat influenza - Equine influenza (2007 Australian outbreak) - Swine influenza

Non-mammals

Avian influenza - Fujian flu (H5N1)

Related

Influenza-like illness

Categories: Epidemiology | Influenza A virus subtype H5N1Hidden categories: All articles with dead external links | Articles with dead external links from June 2008

1907 in New Zealand

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Incumbents

Regal and Vice Regal

Head of State - Edward VII emily crib

Governor - The Lord Plunket GCMG KCVO baby convertible crib

Government baby door bouncer

The 16th New Zealand Parliament, Liberal

Speaker of the House - Sir Arthur Guinness

Prime Minister - Joseph Ward

Minister of Finance - Joseph Ward

Attorney-General - John Findlay

Parliamentary opposition

Leader of the Opposition - William Massey, (Independent).

Main centre leaders

Mayor of Auckland - Arthur Myers

Mayor of Hamilton - James Shiner Bond

Mayor of Wellington - Thomas Hislop

Mayor of Christchurch - John Hall followed by George Payling

Mayor of Dunedin - John Loudon

Appointments and awards

Prime Minister Joseph Ward is appointed to the Privy Council.

James Mills, a prominent businessman, ship-owner and politician becomes the first person born in New Zealand to be knighted (Knight Bachelor).

Events

The Tohunga Suppression Act is passed by parliament, sponsored by Maui Pomare.

Rua Kenana, a self proclaimed prophet, establishes a religious community at the foot of Maungaphatu, the sacred Thoe mountain in the Ureweras.

The Colonial Secretary Office is renamed the Department of Internal Affairs.

St Paul's Church in Dunedin is consecrated by Bishop Churchill Julius.

Highest ever recorded flooding along the Taupo, Tongariro, Waipa, and Waikato river systems.

Health

Dr Sir Frederick Truby King establishes the Royal New Zealand Society for the Health of Women and Children which later becomes The Royal New Zealand Plunket Society, known simply as Plunket. The society establishes Plunket Rooms throughout the country and provides especially trained nurses to advise and assist New Zealand mothers free of charge.

The first Home of Compassion is opened, at Island Bay in Wellington, by Mother Suzanne Aubert who had founded the congregation of the Sisters of Compassion in Jerusalem on the Whanganui River in 1892.

The country's first dental school opens at Otago University. The first dean is Sir Henry Percy Pickerill, a pioneer of reconstructive surgery of the jaw and face.

Arts and literature

The first Edmonds Cookbook is published.

The School Journal, an education resource distributed to schools throughout New Zealand, is introduced.

Frances Hodgkins holds her first solo exhibition, in London.

Publishing firm A.H. & A.W. Reed is established in Dunedin.

The House of Royal Doulton produces Kia Ora, a ceramic series of New Zealand themes, which become a collectors' item.

The sciences

Thames astronomer John Grigg discovers his third comet, all of which are named after him.

Pioneer aircraft designer Richard Pearse finally patents details for his wings and aircraft controls.

Flora and fauna

The now extinct Huia bird which was endemic to New Zealand, is last seen in the Tararua Ranges on 28 December.

Full protection is promulgated for the tui, kk, paradise duck and oystercatcher.

Chamois deer, six does and two bucks from Neuberg in Austria, are introduced to the country and released in the Aoraki/Mount Cook area as a hunting resource.

This is the peak year in the country's history for milling for export of the rapidly disappearing native kauri.

Media

26 September: The first issue of The Dominion newspaper (now the Dominion Post) is published in Wellington to mark the occasion of New Zealand becoming a Dominion.

After 36 years of publication, the authoritative weekly paper, the New Zealand Mail, closes.

Transport

December: The Maori II, a triple-screw steamer which is the first purpose-built, inter-island ferry in the country, makes its first run between Lyttelton and Wellington.

Sport

Boxing (amateur)

National amateur champions

Heavyweight - J. Lloyd (Christchurch)

Middleweight - J. Gilmour (Christchurch)

Lightweight - R. Mayze (Christchurch)

Featherweight - E. Sanderson (Auckland)

Bantamweight - B. Tracy (Wellington)

Cricket

Inaugural year of Plunket Shield, won by Canterbury.

The MCC tour the country, losing to New Zealand at the Basin Reserve, but winning at Lancaster Park.

Chess

The 20th National Chess Championship was held in Christchurch, and was won by W.S. Viner of Perth (overseas players were allowed until 1934)

Golf

The first New Zealand Open championship is held at the Napier Golf Club at Waiohiki and is won by amateur Arthur Duncan.

The 15th National Amateur Championships were held in Napier

Men: Arthur Duncan (Wellington) - 5th title

Women: Mrs G. Williams

Hockey

The Challenge Shield is introduced.

Horse racing

Harness racing

New Zealand Trotting Cup: Marian

Auckland Trotting Cup: All Night

Thoroughbred racing

Apologue becomes the first New Zealand-owned horse to win the Melbourne Cup.

Auckland Cup - Zimmerman.

Wellington Cup - Achilles.

New Zealand Derby - Elevation.

Netball

Women's basketball, now called Netball, is introduced to the country by J. C. Jamieson when a demonstration match between Eden and Epsom is played in an Auckland paddock.

Shooting

The Collins Challenge Shield is introduced by the National Rifle Association.

Rowing

William Webb of Wanganui defeats Australian Charles Towns on August 3 for the World Professional Sculling Championship, the first world rowing title won by New Zealand.

Rugby union

Auckland defend the Ranfurly Shield against Buller (21-0), Hawkes Bay (12-3) and Wanganui(6-5).

The All Blacks tour Australia, winning both tests. They also play Wellington.

A record crowd of 52,411 packs the Sydney Cricket Ground for the All Blacks v NSW match.

Rugby league

The All Golds New Zealand league team tours Britain, before a match has been played or a club has been formed in New Zealand.

Soccer

Provincial league champions:

Auckland: Auckland Corinthians

Canterbury: Burnham Industrial School, Christchurch Celtic (shared)

Otago: Northern Dunedin

Southland: Nightcaps

Taranaki: New Plymouth

Wellington: Wellington Swifts

Tennis

Anthony Wilding of New Zealand pairs with Australian Norman Brookes, as the Australasian team, to win the Davis Cup.

Anthony Wilding and Josiah Ritchie win the men's doubles at the Wimbledon Championship.

Kathleen Nunneley wins the last of her 13 successive national ladies singles titles.

Births

8 October: Stanley Whitehead, politician.

Denis Blundell - future Governor-General.

Alf Cleverley, boxer.

Thaddeus McCarthy - jurist.

Deaths

19 April: Edward Metcalf Smith, politician.

25 June: John Hall - Premier 1879-81

William Henry Eyes, politician.

Tohu Kakahi, Mori leader and prophet at Parihaka

See also

List of years in New Zealand

Timeline of New Zealand history

History of New Zealand

Military history of New Zealand

Timeline of environmental history of New Zealand

Timeline of New Zealand's links with Antarctica

For world events and topics in 1907 not specifically related to New Zealand see: 1907

References

General

Gordon McLauchlan (1992). The Illustrated encyclopedia of New Zealand. David Bateman Ltd, Glenfield, NZ. ISBN 1-86953-007-1. 

Specific

^ Statistics New Zealand: New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1990. ISSN 0078-0170 page 52

^ "Elections NZ - Leaders of the Opposition". http://www.elections.org.nz/democracy/leaders-opposition.html. Retrieved 2008-04-06. 

^ List of New Zealand Chess Champions

^ edited by A. H. McLintock (1966). "Mens' Golf - National Champions". An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand. Te Ara - The Encyclopedia of New Zealand. http://www.teara.govt.nz/1966/G/GolfMens/NewZealandAmateurChampions/en. Retrieved 2009-02-13. 

^ List of NZ Trotting cup winners

^ Auckland Trotting cup at hrnz.co.nz

^ "New Zealand: List of champions". Rec.Sport.Soccer Statistics Foundation. 1999. http://www.rsssf.com/tablesn/nzchamp.html. 

^ rulers.org

Categories: 1907 in New Zealand

2009 AMA Pro Racing Championship season

China Suppliers


Season Calendar

No

Date kumho tires

Round/Circuit pirelli tire

Superbike Race 1 Winner falken tire

Superbike Race 2 Winner

Sportbike Race 1 Winner

Sportbike Race 2 Winner

1

March 4-6

Daytona

Mat Mladin

-

Ben Bostrom

-

2

March 20-22

Fontana

Mat Mladin

Mat Mladin

Danny Eslick

Danny Eslick

3

April 3-5

Road Atlanta

Mat Mladin

Mat Mladin

Martin Cardenas

Danny Eslick

4

May 1-3

Barber

Mat Mladin

Mat Mladin

Martin Cardenas

Martin Cardenas

5

May 15-17

Infineon

Josh Hayes

Mat Mladin

Martin Cardenas

Martin Cardenas

6

June 5-7

Road America

Mat Mladin

Larry Pegram

Chris Peris

Martin Cardenas

7

July 3-5

Laguna Seca

Mat Mladin

-

Ben Bostrom

-

8

July 17-19

Mid-Ohio

Josh Hayes

Josh Hayes

Danny Eslick

Danny Eslick

9

July 31-August 2

Heartland

Larry Pegram

Larry Pegram

Danny Eslick

Martin Cardenas

10

August 14-16

VIR

Josh Hayes

Josh Hayes

Josh Herrin

Josh Herrin

11

September 4-6

New Jersey

Josh Hayes

Josh Hayes

Josh Herrin

Josh Herrin

AMA Pro American Superbike

Riders' standings

Pos

Rider

Bike

DAY

FON

RAT

BAR

INF

RAM

LAG

M-O

HRT

VIR

N-J

Pts

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

1

Mat Mladin

Suzuki

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

5

1

1

2

1

3

7

2

9

24

2

453

2

Josh Hayes

Yamaha

8

6

6

5

4

5

4

1

4

17

25

4

1

1

6

3

1

1

1

1

406

3

Tommy Hayden

Suzuki

3

2

2

2

6

4

8

2

3

9

7

8

6

3

4

2

5

2

2

22

373

5

Larry Pegram

Ducati

4

27

3

7

10

6

6

3

5

4

1

10

5

5

1

1

12

4

5

4

347

5

Ben Bostrom

Yamaha

6

7

5

8

8

3

3

9

2

3

5

5

4

2

2

19

3

3

4

23

333

6

Blake Young

Suzuki

5

4

9

4

2

2

25

5

8

2

7

4

3

8

6

7

7

9

290

7

Aaron Yates

Suzuki

7

15

10

6

5

10

2

4

21

6

3

3

2

23

5

21

4

5

3

3

290

8

Geoff May

Suzuki

10

3

4

3

3

7

5

15

6

27

4

9

8

8

8

20

26

22

10

10

234

9

Taylor Knapp

Suzuki

Buell

31

9

7

17

7

9

9

6

7

25

24

11

12

10

9

5

8

6

6

12

207

10

Jake Holden

Honda

35

5

24

10

9

8

7

21

20

12

9

7

9

21

7

4

7

10

11

6

195

11

Neil Hodgson

Honda

2

23

9

16

6

6

11

9

10

6

11

8

13

5

167

12

Chris Ulrich

Suzuki

14

11

26

11

12

14

11

8

22

11

14

12

13

22

11

9

13

12

12

13

156

13

David Anthony

Suzuki

30

8

8

9

11

11

10

7

8

8

10

26

26

24

120

14

Scott Jensen

Honda

16

16

12

15

15

26

12

12

11

14

13

13

11

16

23

19

15

105

15

Michael Laverty

Suzuki

9

12

24

2

22

10

6

22

7

9

24

98

16

Aaron Gobert

Suzuki

12

10

11

16

13

17

13

14

12

26

12

14

87

17

Hawk Mazzotta

Suzuki

13

14

13

14

14

16

17

13

14

13

69

18

Shawn Higbee

Buell

25

18

15

20

19

18

15

20

18

15

14

13

18

16

18

17

61

19

Shane Narbonne

Suzuki

19

25

14

20

20

23

21

14

11

15

16

15

17

15

16

60

20

Mark Crozier

Yamaha

20

18

17

21

14

11

15

10

27

25

25

17

14

17

20

42

21

Ryan Elleby

Suzuki

33

13

16

13

26

20

10

7

13

55

22

Scott Charlton

Bike

12

10

14

13

14

11

52

23

Eric Haugo

Suzuki

24

16

21

22

19

16

17

16

15

16

21

18

17

22

20

21

21

32

24

Barrett Long

Ducati

17

12

18

15

20

17

12

36

25

Dean Mizdal

Suzuki

23

20

18

16

17

17

19

17

17

15

21

18

36

26

Jeff Wood

Suzuki

11

10

11

31

27

Cory West

Bike

8

7

27

28

Ricky Corey

Yamaha

15

19

15

16

14

26

29

Damian Cudlin

Bike

9

8

25

30

Cory Call

Suzuki

10

13

16

24

26

Jeffrey Tigert

Honda

15

13

27

14

27

Johnny Rock Page

Suzuki

26

22

15

18

19

22

11

29

Doug Polen

Yamaha

13

19

10

30

Skip Salenius

Suzuki

19

19

18

18

10

31

Jeremy Toye

Honda

12

22

27

9

33

Brad Puetz

Suzuki

23

21

19

18

25

5

34

Josh Graham

Suzuki

27

21

17

22

21

4

35

Trent Gibson

Suzuki

21

17

4

36

Brad Hendry

Ducati

22

17

23

4

37

Ron Hix

Suzuki

20

18

4

38

Reno Karimian

Suzuki

24

19

25

19

4

39

Dominic Jones

Suzuki

23

26

18

4

40

Scott Greenwood

Suzuki

18

3

41

Brian Boyd

Suzuki

19

20

3

42

Davie Stone

Honda

29

26

19

23

2

43

Mark Simon

Suzuki

22

20

22

23

1

44

Marcin Biernacki

Suzuki

24

21

0

45

Brett McCormick

Suzuki

21

0

46

Tim Hunt

Suzuki

24

21

0

47

Walt Sipp

Buell

24

22

0

48

Kevin Boisvert

Suzuki

24

23

0

49

David Kunzelman

Suzuki

24

0

50

David Loikits

Suzuki

28

0

Pos

Rider

Bike

DAY

FON

RAT

BAR

INF

RAM

LAG

M-O

HRT

VIR

N-J

Pts

Colour

Result

Gold

Winner (1)

Silver

2nd place (2)

Bronze

3rd place (3)

Green

Finished, in points (4-20)

Blue

Finished, no points (21+)

Purple

Did not finish (Ret)

Not classified (NC)

Red

Did not qualify (DNQ)

Black

Disqualified (DSQ)

White

Did not start (DNS)

Blank

Did not participate

Withdrawn due to injury (INJ)

Excluded (EX)

Race cancelled (C)

Bold

Pole Position

Participants

Team

Constructor

Motorcycle

No

Rider

Yamaha Motor Corp. USA

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R1

2

Benjamin Bostrom

4

Joshua Hayes

Suzuki/Blackfoot/Picotte Motorsports

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

6

Brett McCormick

Rockstar/Makita/Suzuki

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

7

Mat Mladin

22

Tommy Hayden

79

Blake Young

Celtic Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

8

Michael Laverty

Liberty Waves Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

9

Eric Haugo

Higbee-Racing.com

Buell

Buell 1125R

11

Shawn Higbee

Team Hooters Suzuki

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R1000

12

Shane Narbonne

21

Ryan Elleby

Roadracingworld.com/Suzuki

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R1000

18

Chris Ulrich

Bettencourts Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R1000

19

Jeff Wood

Jordan Suzuki

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R1000

23

Aaron Yates

Aussie Dave Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R1000

25

David Anthony

121

Hawk Mazzotta

Four Feathers Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R1

27

Mark Crozier

Longevity Racing

Ducati

Ducati 1098R

29

Barrett Long

M Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

38

Dean Mizdal

Greenwood Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

41

Scott Greenwood

Taylor Knapp Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

44

Taylor Knapp

SRK Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

45

Brad Puetz

Team Reno

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

48

Reno Karimian

National Guard Jordan Suzuki

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

54

Geoff May

Loikits Industries Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

55

David Loikits

Moto Garage Racing

Suzuki &

Yamaha

Suzuki GSXR1000 &

Yamaha YZF-R1

58

Josh Graham

61

Scott Jensen

Holden Racing

Honda

Honda CBR1000RR

59

Jake Holden

59

Aaron Gobert

MDK Motorsports

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

62

Cory Call

Marietta Motorsports

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

63

Skip Salenius

Bayside Performance

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

68

Kevin Boisvert

Foremost Insurance/Pegram Racing Ducati

Ducati

Ducati 1098R

72

Larry Pegram

TigerTeam Racing

Honda

Honda CBR1000RR

91

Jeffrey Tigert

AGR Inc.

Honda

Honda CBR1000RR

96

Aaron Gobert

Corona Extra Honda

Honda

Honda CBR1000RR

100

Neil Hodgson

100

Jake Holden

X Dot Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSXR1000

102

Mark Simon

Walt Sipp Racing

Buell

Buell 1125R

221

Charles Sipp

944 Magazine/Energized by Verve!/

JohnnyRockPage.com

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R1

269

Johnny Rock Page

AllStoneArmy.com

Honda

Honda CBR1000RR

270

Davie Stone

Lee's Cycle Racing

Honda

Honda CBR1000RR

571

Jeremy Toye

Nor CO Racing

Ducati

Ducati 1098R

616

Brad Hendry

Key

Regular Rider

Wildcard Rider

Replacement Rider

All entries utilize Dunlop tyres.

AMA Pro Daytona SportBike

Riders'standings

Pos

Rider

Bike

DAY

FON

RAT

BAR

INF

RAM

LAG

M-O

HRT

VIR

N-J

Pts

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

R1

R2

1

Daniel Eslick

Buell

73

1

1

3

1

8

3

5

12

6

5

8

1

1

1

3

7

2

5

7

387

2

Josh Herrin

Yamaha

2

6

5

6

2

4

30

31

3

13

13

3

2

8

2

2

1

1

1

1

382

3

Martin Cardenas

Suzuki

9

3

4

1

34

1

1

1

1

3

1

36

12

3

18

1

9

11

42

37

340

4

Jamie Hacking

Kawasaki

4

2

2

7

5

3

2

2

13

8

9

9

35

2

3

9

12

5

299

5

Jason DiSalvo

Suzuki

3

4

3

19

7

2

7

16

2

12

3

32

9

11

6

4

2

27

13

8

283

6

Jake Zemke

Honda

11

5

6

4

39

7

28

8

5

36

2

29

4

10

7

6

4

7

6

2

258

7

Chris Peris

Honda

DSQ

7

10

9

3

10

23

7

7

1

4

7

8

12

10

10

33

8

7

4

244

8

Tommy Aquino

Yamaha

61

10

8

8

32

5

13

6

4

14

18

4

3

9

3

5

32

3

31

3

235

9

Chaz Davies

Aprilia

7

8

7

5

6

28

4

4

31

39

8

2

5

7

4

36

36

30

2

29

219

10

Steve Rapp

Yamaha

12

9

9

41

9

6

14

3

6

27

12

6

6

6

34

15

5

25

3

30

200

11

Taylor Knapp

Buell

10

4

9

15

34

9

4

6

37

7

4

12

8

17

4

21

12

178

12

Roger hayden

Kawasaki

2

31

14

37

9

40

2

11

38

40

5

9

7

10

5

38

6

164

22

Ben Bostrom

Yamaha

1

1

62

23

Leandro Mercado

Kawasaki

10

11

11

31

25

Barrett Long

Yamaha

6

13

18

26

20

Shawn Higbee

Buell

5

15

35

22

18

Dane Westby

Yamaha

8

21

14

20

16

Damian Cudlin

Yamaha

13

18

16

16

15

Michael Barnes

Buell

25

12

15

15

17

Christopher Fillmore

Yamaha

14

13

15

19

Robertino Pietri

Yamaha

66

31

12

9

20

Garrett Carter

Yamaha

17

17

36

8

23

Russ Wikle

Suzuki

15

6

24

Miguel Duhamel

Suzuki

16

5

25

Eric Wood

Honda

18

3

26

Santiago Villa

Suzuki

19

25

21

2

27

Shea Fouchek

Honda

19

Ret

2

28

Jeffrey Tigert

Honda

27

20

1

29

Tyler Odom

Honda

20

34

34

1

30

Josh Hayes

Yamaha

Ret

1

31

Melissa Paris

Yamaha

21

0

32

Fernando Amantini

Kawasaki

51

22

25

0

33

Ricky Parker

Yamaha

Ret

22

0

34

Eric Haugo

Yamaha

56

23

23

0

35

Ty Howard

Aprilia

23

0

36

Sahar Zvik

Suzuki

24

24

0

37

David Sadowski, Jr.

Yamaha

24

0

38

Larry Myers

Kawasaki

50

26

26

0

39

Josh Bryan

Buell

34

27

28

0

40

Chris Clark

Yamaha

36

27

0

41

Dylon Husband

Kawasaki

25

28

30

0

42

Ryan Patterson

Yamaha

28

0

43

Charles Sipp

Yamaha

42

29

29

0

44

Marcos Reichert

Yamaha

29

0

45

Chip Yates

Suzuki

30

31

0

46

Ricky Orlando

Kawasaki

30

0

47

Armando Ferrer

Suzuki

31

0

48

Jamie Hall

Yamaha

32

32

0

49

Bostjan Skubic

Yamaha

32

0

50

Kevin Boisvert

Suzuki

33

33

0

51

Nicky Moore

Kawasaki

33

0

52

Dustin Ohara

Suzuki

35

0

53

Mark Crozier

Triumph

36

0

54

Anthony Fania

Suzuki

37

0

55

Matthew McBride

Suzuki

38

0

56

Meghan Stiles

Yamaha

39

0

57

Shane Narbonne

Aprilia

40

0

58

David McPherson

Yamaha

41

0

59

Mark McCormick

Yamaha

43

0

60

Dean Mizdal

Kawasaki

44

0

61

Jean Paul Tache

Yamaha

45

0

62

Lloyd Bayley

Yamaha

46

0

63

Troy Vincent

Suzuki

47

0

64

Gene Burcham

Ducati

48

0

65

Mike deBrabant

Suzuki

54

0

66

Ray Hofman

Honda

55

0

67

Scott Jensen

Aprilia

57

0

68

Clinton Gibson

Kawasaki

58

0

69

Craig Moodie

Yamaha

59

0

70

Bryan Bemisderfer

Buell

60

0

71

Justin Filice

Triumph

62

0

72

James Digiandomenico

Yamaha

63

0

73

Kris Turner

Suzuki

64

0

74

Paul Schwemmer

Kawasaki

65

0

75

Rodney Vest

Suzuki

67

0

76

Kyle Keesee

Kawasaki

68

0

77

Daniel Parkerson

Kawasaki

69

0

78

Ryan Elleby

Aprilia

DNS

0

79

Jason Quillman

Yamaha

DNS

0

80

Ben Thompson

Aprilia

22

37

17

-1

81

Alan Schmidt

Buell

DSQ

38

20

-4

82

Alistair Douglas

Suzuki

52

-5

83

Andres Londono

Yamaha

53

-5

84

John Ashmead

Kawasaki

DSQ

-5

Pos

Rider

Bike

DAY

FON

RAT

BAR

INF

RAM

LAG

M-O

HRT

VIR

N-J

Pts

Colour

Result

Gold

Winner (1)

Silver

2nd place (2)

Bronze

3rd place (3)

Green

Finished, in points (4-20)

Blue

Finished, no points (21+)

Purple

Did not finish (Ret)

Not classified (NC)

Red

Did not qualify (DNQ)

Black

Disqualified (DSQ)

White

Did not start (DNS)

Blank

Did not participate

Withdrawn due to injury (INJ)

Excluded (EX)

Race cancelled (C)

Bold

Pole Position

Sportbike wildcard and replacement riders results

Rider

Positions

Rider

Position in Track

Participants

Team

Constructor

Motorcycle

No

Rider

Team Graves Yamaha

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

1s

Ben Bostrom

4

Josh Hayes

6

Tommy Aquino

8

Josh Herrin

Erion Racing

Honda

Honda CBR600RR

1x

Jake Zemke

10

Chris Peris

M4 Suzuki

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

3

Kris Turner

36

Martin Cardenas

40

Jason DiSalvo

Roadracingworld.com/Suzuki

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

5

Russ Wikle

32

Santiago Villa

Amantini Racing

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

7

Fernando Amantini

Bruce Rossmeyers Daytona Racing/

RMR Buell

Buell

Buell 1125R

9

Danny Eslick

Higbee-Racing.com

Buell

Buell 1125R

11

Shawn Higbee

Team Hooters Aprilia

Aprilia

Aprilia RSV1000R

12

Shane Narbonne

21

Ryan Elleby

Crozier Motorsports

Triumph

Triumph Daytona 675

14

Mark Crozierr

Suzuki/Blackfoot/Picotte Motorsports

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

17

Miguel Duhamel

Liberty Waves Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

19

Eric Haugo

Sadowski Brothers

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

22

David Sadowski, Jr.

Four Feathers Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

26

Jean Paul Tache

27

Steve Rapp

Giant Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

28

Alistair Douglas

Paradigm Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

29

Barrett Long

R & B Motorsports

Triumph

Triumph Daytona 675

30

Justin Filice

Garrett Carter Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

31

Garrett Carter

Vallely Racing/Riders Choice

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

33

Matthew McBride

GEICO Powersports/RMR Buell Racing

Buell

Buell 1125R

34

Michael Barnes

Brady Racing

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

37

John Ashmead

M Racing

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

38

Dean Mizdal

Fouchek Racing

Honda

Honda CBR600RR

39

Shea Fouchek

Latus Motors Racing

Buell

Buell 1125R

45

Josh Bryan

54

Alan Schmidt

Don Odom Racing

Honda

Honda CBR600RR

46

Tyler Odom

Bazzaz

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

48

Chris Clark

Team E.S.P. Yamaha

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

51

Damian Cudlin

311

Robertino Pietri

Team Woodcraft/Heyser Racing

Honda

Honda CBR600RR

53

Eric Wood

CF Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

55

Christopher Fillmore

Factory Aprilia Millennium Technologies Team

Aprilia

Aprilia RSV1000R

57

Chaz Davies

97

Ben Thompson

Team Beck Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

60

Michael Beck

Chronic Motorsports

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

63

Lloyd Bayley

TeamHurtByAccident.com

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

64

Armando Ferrer

Ridesmart Motorcycle Schools

Aprilia

Aprilia RSV1000R

67

Ty Howard

Bayside Performance

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

68

Kevin Boisvert

BSB/Keesee Racing

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

69

Kyle Keesee

JP Motorsports

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

70

Daniel Parkerson

Team Pur Sang Racing

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

73

Dylon Husband

370

Clint Gibson

Black Hole Racing

Aprilia

Aprilia RSV1000R

76

Scott Jensen

KSW Insurance Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

84

Anthony Fania

Monster Energy Attack Kawasaki

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

88

Jamie Hacking

95

Leandro Mercado

Swigz.com Pro Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

89

Chip Yates

GBR Motors

Ducati

Ducati 848

94

Gene Burcham

RPR Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

96

Ricky Parker

HDFR Racing

Buell

Buell 1125R

98

Bryan Bemisderfer

Rockwall Performance

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

101

Marcos Reichert

deBrabant Motorsports

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

111

Mike deBrabant

Ricky Orlando Racing

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

112

Ricky Orlando

Dry Rider Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

113

Craig Moodie

D & R Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

125

Ryan Patterson

TWC/RoadRacePrep.com

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

126

Jamie Hall

SRK Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

161

Sahar Zvik

WisconsinSportbikes.net

Honda

Honda CBR600RR

171

Ray Hofman

Old Pros Racing

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

177

Paul Schwemmer

TigerTeam Racing

Honda

Honda CBR600RR

191

Jeffrey Tigert

AAA Lift Truck

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

199

Larry Myers

Destiny Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

204

Andres Londono

Westby Racing/Kneedraggers.com

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

213

Dane Westby

Walt Sipp Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

221

Charles Sipp

R & R Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

310

Rodney Vest

Quillman Motorsports

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

321

Jason Quillman

J & T Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

322

James Digiandomenico

MarkBilt

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

413

Melissa Paris

Inotherm Racing Team

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

474

Bostjan Skubic

484

Bostjan Pintar

Nicky Moore

Kawasaki

Kawasaki ZX-6R

505

Nicky Moore

McNology Racing

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

528

Mark McCormick

594

David McPherson

TVH Racing

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

715

Troy Vincent

Team Stiles

Yamaha

Yamaha YZF-R6

746

Meghan Stiles

RDS Cycles

Suzuki

Suzuki GSX-R600

819

Dustin Ohara

Key

Regular Rider

Wildcard Rider

Replacement Rider

All entries utilize Dunlop tyres.

References

^ American Superbike Rider Standings, AMAproracing.com, http://www.amaproracing.com/rr/events/standings.cfm?class=sb, retrieved 2009-10-25 

^ Daytona SportBike Rider Standings, AMAproracing.com, http://www.amaproracing.com/rr/events/standings.cfm?class=ds, retrieved 2009-10-25 

v  d  e

AMA Superbike Championship

Seasons

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Lists

Riders (Champions) Race Winners Circuits

Related articles

AMA Supersport Championship Superbike racing Superbike World Championship Supersport World Championship British Superbike Championship All Japan Road Race Championship MotoGP World Championship

Categories: AMA Superbike ChampionshipHidden categories: Wikipedia articles in need of updating